The Dalai Lama this week expressed concern that there was little likelihood of improvement for the Tibetan cause, despite relaxing his demands in recent years. Facing huge crowds in Dharamsala on 10th March after a series of protests and demonstrations, he gave his annual commemoration speech, marking the 51st anniversary since the failed Tibetan revolt. The date is also the 2nd anniversary of the 2008 riots in which dozens were killed by Chinese security, in the largest scale protests against the regime in 50 years.
The Tibetan spiritual leader reiterated his position that he does not intend to assume a political role if his country achieves autonomy or independence, the same being said for the government in exile. 
Despite links and meetings with numerous foreign political figures, most notable recently both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, sufficient diplomatic and popular pressure has yet to develop. He decried the security situation in the country which he claims treats Tibetans as second class citizens and is trying to annihilate Buddhism:
“They are putting the monks and nuns in prison-like conditions, depriving them the opportunity to study and practice in peace. These conditions make the monasteries function more like museums and are intended to deliberately annihilate Buddhism.” 
China continues to denounce the Dalai Lama’s position as the spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism, prohibiting his adoration and labeling him as merely a “political monk”. They contend that the existence of a constitution for the Tibetan “government-in-exile” undermines the movement’s claims that it is not seeking independence. Officials describe the Tibetan region as “an inalienable part of China” which has benefitted both socially and economically from its integration over the last 50 years.
China first invaded Tibet in 1950 and, following a failed uprising in March 1959, the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of Tibetans fled into exile in India. During the years of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution, there followed a characteristic policy of assimilation and “patriotic re-education”. The Tibetan language, culture and history were replaced in both education, and official society, by those of China. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese were also encouraged to settle throughout the plateau, resulting in ethnic majorities in certain regions, most notably Lhasa. The latter policy inevitably assisted in the operation of the former, as China has been surprisingly successful in permeating its “history” of shared culture and unity.
Tibetans’ dogged loyalty to their own past has led to fierce repression over the last 50 years in which an estimated 90% of their cultural heritage has been destroyed. Following the 2008 protests, in anticipation of the Beijing Olympics, the security situation has been further tightened.
Apart from exceptions for visits of foreign journalists, military patrols are a regular feature of Lhasa’s streets. Tibetan visitors to the capital are also required to provide three pieces of documentary evidence to avoid detention. These include: their identity card, a temporary residence permit and a letter of introduction allowing them to be in Lhasa. Ethnic Han Chinese are not stopped for these checks.
China argues that it introduced democratic reforms in 1959 which have brought great social and economic progress for ordinary Tibetans, and that current security in the region is merely intended to ensure peace. 
China has invested some 154 billion yuan ($21 billion) in the territory over the last decade on infrastructure and various other development projects. They appreciate that the large-scale nature of many of their previous initiatives has done little to win over the minds of ordinary Tibetans. In recent years they have therefore changed their approach, focusing on local communities and encouraging tourism and small-scale industry. Although many remain skeptical, the process appears to be bearing fruit, as posters of Mao Zedong and President Hu Jintao have begun to appear on walls.
Amongst the exile community, an awareness of the superiority of China has affected both official policy and individual interpretations. The Dalai Lama has switched his stance from full independence to greater rights and autonomy for Tibetans within the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Exiles, who tend to follow the path of their spiritual leader, concede the advantages of a harmonious relationship with their neighbor.
This shift in demands following the defeats of 2008 may mark an end of hope for the Tibetan cause. Relations will probably normalise over time, but with Tibetan culture likely further subsumed within that of China. The examples from the UK in this regard are particularly poignant.
The successful conquest of the neighbouring states of England saw Wales, Scotland, Cornwall and Ireland all become integral parts of a greater Kingdom. Local culture and language was repressed and often prohibited, mass migrations were encouraged to dilute indigenous populations and the histories of the regions were suitably altered. Although Ireland eventually broke away, the others have remained, as they understand the impracticality of attempting to stand in the world without their richer neighbour. Relations are now normalised and, having made sacrifices to become anglicised, the possibilities of separation seem remote.    
The history of the “United Kingdom” bears an interesting template perhaps for the future of Tibet as a state.